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Abstract
The security analysis of physical encryption protocol based on coherent
pulse position modulation(CPPM) originated by Yuen is one of the most
interesting topics in the study of cryptosystem with a security level be-
yond the Shannon limit. Although the implementation of CPPM scheme
has certain difficulty, several methods have been proposed recently. This
paper deals with the CPPM encryption in terms of symplectic transfor-
mation, which includes a phase mask encryption as a special example,
and formulates a unified security analysis for such encryption schemes.
Specifically, we give a lower bound of Eve’s symbol error probability us-
ing reliability function theory to ensure that our proposed system exceeds
the Shannon limit. Then we assume the secret key is given to Eve after
her heterodyne measurement. Since this assumption means that Eve has
a great advantage in the sense of the conventional cryptography, the lower
bound of her error indeed ensures the security level beyond the Shannon
limit. In addition, we show some numerical examples of the security per-
formance.
1 Introduction
The concept of quantum random cipher was proposed by H. P. Yuen and im-
plemented through phase shift keying (PSK) modulation [5] and intensity mod-
ulation (IM) [1], which are called αη system or Y00 system. These systems
enable us to realize high speed direct data transmission with security protected
by physical phenomena. Moreover he gave another implementation of quan-
tum random cipher by using coherent pulse position modulation (CPPM) and
shown that N -ary detection can overcome the limitation on the binary detection
advantage of optimal quantum receiver for PSK or IM signal states [6]. This
brings a new scheme for both key generation and direct encryption. The CPPM
system has a set of pulse position modulation (PPM) signals
|Φℓ〉 = |0〉1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |0〉ℓ−1 ⊗ |
√
S〉ℓ ⊗ |0〉ℓ+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |0〉N , ℓ = 1, ...., N (1)
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for N messages. The state |Φℓ〉 is encrypted to a CPPM signal
|Ψkℓ 〉 = Uk|Φℓ〉 = ⊗Nn=1|αkℓ,n〉n (2)
by a unitary operator Uk randomly chosen by a running key k generated from
the pseudo random number generator (PRNG) on the secret shared key. The
CPPM system can be realized physically by at least N -beam splitters [6], and it
is generally represented by symplectic transformations for multi mode Gaussian
states [3]. A defect of this system is that it does not have scalability in the
implementation. Since loss at beam splitters has a serious effect on the system, it
is almost impossible to implement the system with enough security. So we need
to find a more feasible method of encryption. In order to meet this requirement,
Yuen proposed another type of encryption [9], where a phase mask is employed
in order to implement the unitary operator Uk. The phase mask can be easily
realized by the liquid crystal modulator (LCM) or the acousto-optic modulator
(AOM).
In Shannon theory for the symmetric key cipher, the information theoretic
security against ciphertext only attack on data has the limit
H(X |Y ) ≤ H(K), (3)
where the plaintext, the corresponding ciphertext and the secret key are denoted
by the random variables X , Y and K respectively. This is called Shannon limit
for the symmetric key cipher. In the context of random cipher, we can exceed
this limit. Still the necessary and sufficient condition for exceeding the limit is
not clear, but if the following relation holds, we can say that the cipher exceeds
the Shannon limit
H(X |Y E ,K) > H(X |Y B,K), (4)
where the ciphertext of the legitimate receiver (Bob) and that of the eavesdrop-
per (Eve) are denoted by Y E and Y B respectively. This means that Eve cannot
pin down the information bit even if she gets a secret key after measurement of
the ciphertext while Bob can do it. We showed that the CPPM system with the
encryption (2) has such a property [3]. In this paper we clarify that our random
cipher also has it. For this purpose we evaluate Eve’s symbol error probability
P¯E under the assumption that Eve can know the secret key after obtaining an
electrical signal by her measurement. We give a more precise evaluation of P¯E
than in [3], and obtain a lower bound of exponent Es(R) characterizing P¯E .
This enables us to show ”strong converse to the coding theorem” [6] for Eve’s
channel. Our interest is devoted to direct encryption in particular, but our dis-
cussions can be also applied to security analysis of key generation system. In
particular the exponent Es(R) plays an important role in the latter case [6].
This paper gives a general formulation of phase mask encryption by sym-
plectic transformations for quantum Gaussian waveforms and presents a method
for analyzing the Eve’s symbol error probability. It is organized as follows: in
Section 2 we overview the quantum random cipher and results about error prob-
abilities of Bob. In addition we represent the PPM signals in terms of quantum
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Figure 1: configuration of quantum random cipher system
Gaussian waveform as a preparation for considering the phase mask encryption
in the next section. In Section 3 we formulate the phase mask encryption basing
on the general theory of Gaussian state developed by Holevo [12]. In Section
4 the security of the proposed system is evaluated by analyzing a symbol error
probability of Eve.
2 Quantum random cipher with PPM signals
2.1 Basic structure of quantum random cipher
We briefly explain a configuration of quantum random cipher (Fig. 1). The
sender(Alice) modulates her classical message ℓ to obtain a signal state ρℓ.
Then the signal state is transformed into an encrypted state ρ˜ℓ by a unitary
operator Uk, which is randomly chosen via a running key k generated by using
PRNG on a secret key K. We assume the encrypted state ρ˜ℓ is sent through
the ideal channel. Since the secret key K, PRNG and map k → Uk are shared
by Alice and Bob, Bob can apply the unitary operator U †k to the received state
ρ˜ℓ and obtains the signal state ρℓ. Thus Bob can receive a classical message ℓ′
with a very small error by applying the optimum detection to ρℓ. In contrast,
Eve does not know the secret key K and hence she must detect encrypted state
ρ˜ℓ directly. This makes Eve’s symbol error probability worse than Bob’s one.
In the quantum random cipher, a ciphertext is protected against Eve’s attack
by a quantum noise. This enables fresh key generation by communication or
information theoretic security against known plaintext attack in the symmetric
key cipher. So evaluation of Eves’s symbol error probability is essential for
security analysis of quantum random cipher.
2.2 Bob’s symbol error probability for PPM signals
We restrict ourselves to the case where ρℓ is given by the PPM signal |Φℓ〉〈Φℓ|
and each mode in Eq. (1) is from a different time segment. The PPM signals
are quantum analog of orthogonal signals in classical communication theory, and
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error probabilities given by detections for them are summarized in [16]. When
the optimum receiver is used, the symbol error probability is [10, 17]
P oB =
N − 1
N2
{[1 + (N − 1)e−S ]1/2 − (1− e−S)1/2}2. (5)
When the photon counting receiver is used, the symbol error probability is
P cB = (1− 1/N)e−S, (6)
where error occurs when no photons are found in any of the modes.
Let the signals be transmitted every T seconds. The signal power is ~ωcP =
~ωcS/T with an oscillator frequency ωc and the rate is R = lnN/T [ebits/sec].
Then it is found that for fixed any values of P and R we have P oB → 0 and
P cB → 0 as T → ∞. This means that the capacity has an infinite value in
both cases. On the other hand, the quasi-classical(homodyne) receiver, cannot
achieve an infinite capacity [16]. As clarified later, Eve’s optimum receiver is
of such a type, and the capacity takes a finite value. This implies that we can
make Eve’s symbol error probability close to 1 with keeping P oB or P
c
B close to
0. The estimation of Eve’s symbol error probability is shown in Section 4.
2.3 Quantum Gaussian Waveform
In order to describe the unitary operator Uk in Section 3, we summarize the
description of the electromagnetic field generated by a signal source. For sim-
plicity, we use the Holevo’s notations given in the section IV.4 [13]; more realistic
ones can be found in [11].
Let us consider the periodic operator-valued function
X(t) =
∞∑
j=1
√
2π~ωj
T
(
aje
−iωjt + a†je
iωjt
)
t ∈ [0, T ], (7)
where [0, T ] is the observation interval, a†j , aj are the creation-annihilation op-
erators and ωj = 2πj/T . We assume the mode aj is described by the Gaussian
states
ρj(αj) =
1
πNj
∫
exp
(
−|z − αj |
2
Nj
)
|z〉〈z|d2z (8)
with the first two moments given by
Trρj(αj)aj = αj , (9)
Trρj(αj)a
†
jaj = Nj + |αj |2. (10)
Then the whole process X(t) is characterized by the product Gaussian states
ρα = ⊗∞j=1ρj(αj), such that
TrραX(t) = α(t), (11)
4
Trρα
1
4π
∫ T
0
X(t)2dt =
∞∑
j=1
~ωj(Nj +
1
2
) +
1
4π
∫ T
0
α(t)2dt. (12)
Here α(t) is a classical signal for quantum Gaussian channel,
α(t) =
∞∑
j=1
√
2π~ωj
T
(αje
−iωjt + α¯jeiωjt), (13)
where α¯j is a complex conjugate of αj .
Now let us rewrite the PPM quantum signal |Φℓ〉 by using the representation
of quantum Gaussian waveform. The classical signal corresponding to |Φℓ〉 is
given by
αℓ(t) = αc(t)χIℓ(t) (14)
where
αc(t) =
√
2π~ωc
T
√
NS(e−iωct + eiωct), (15)
χIℓ(t) =
{
1, t ∈ Iℓ
0, t ∈ [0, T ] \ Iℓ , (16)
ωc = 2πjc/T is a carrier frequency and Iℓ = [(ℓ− 1)T/N, ℓT/N ]. Assuming the
value of 2jc is divisible by N , we obtain the energy of signal α
ℓ as
1
4π
∫ T
0
αℓ(t)2dt = ~ωcS. (17)
The Gaussian state corresponding to the classical signal αℓ(t) is given by
ρℓ = ⊗∞j=1ρj(αℓj), ρj(αℓj) = |αℓj〉〈αℓj |, (18)
where we obtain the values of αℓj from the Fourier series expansion of α
ℓ(t):
αℓ(t) =
∞∑
j=1
√
2π~ωj
T
(
αℓje
−iωjt + α¯ℓje
iωjt
)
. (19)
Applying the relation
αℓ(t) = α1(t− ℓ− 1
N
T ), ℓ = 1, ...., N (20)
to Eq. (19), we have
αℓj = α
1
je
iωj(ℓ−1)T/N = α1je
i2πj(ℓ−1)/N . (21)
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3 Phase mask encryption
In this section we introduce an idea of canonical encryption basing on the general
theory of Gaussian state [12]. The canonical encryption gives a generalization
of encryptions used in the CPPM and phase mask systems. Particularly we are
interested in the phase mask encryption, which are formulated in the subsection
3.4. In our phase mask encryption we apply a unitary transformation on a
finite number of modes with frequencies ωj in the vicinity of a nominal carrier
frequency ωc, i.e. j ∈ J = {j > 0; |ωj − ωc| < B} = {j1, ..., jM}, although PPM
signals are represented by infinite number of modes in the picture of Gaussian
waveform. So we may also confine ourselves to a system with a finite number of
degrees of freedom in the subsections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. Note that the canonical
encryption is defined by using Stone-von Neumann theorem, which does not
hold for an infinite number of degrees of freedom [18]. From Eqs. (41),(42)
and (43) it is found that for an arbitrary small ǫ there exists j0 > 0 such that
|αℓj | < ǫ holds for any j > j0. So our assumption of finite bandwidth does not
affect the security of our system.
3.1 General Definition of Gaussian States
We give a general definition of Gaussian state. In the following superscript T
denotes transpose operation for a vector or matrix. Let us consider the Weyl
operator for a real vector z = (zqj1 , z
p
j1
, ...., zqjM , z
p
jM
)T
V (z) = exp i
∑
j∈J
(zqj qj + z
p
j pj), (22)
where
qj =
√
~
2ωj
(aj + a
†
j)
pj = i
√
~ωj
2
(a†j − aj),
(23)
are canonical pairs satisfying the Heisenberg CCR
[qj , pk] = iδj,kI, [qj , qk] = [pj , pk] = 0. (24)
Here δj,k takes the value of 1 when j = k and the value of 0 otherwise. The
Weyl operators V (z) satisfy the Weyl-Segal CCR
V (z)V (z′) = exp
[
i
2
∆(z, z′)
]
V (z + z′), (25)
with ∆(z, z′) = ~
∑
j∈J (z
′q
j z
p
j−zqj z′pj ). The density operator ρ is called Gaussian
if its quantum characteristic function has the form
TrρV (z) = exp
[
ivT z − 1
2
zTAz
]
, (26)
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with mean vector v and correlation matrix A. In particular, the Gaussian state
ρℓ given by Eq. (18) has the mean vector
v = ΩM (xj1 , yj1 , ....., xjM , yjM )
T (27)
with αj = xj + iyj and
ΩM = ⊕Mm=1
[ √
2~/ωjm 0
0
√
2~ωjm
]
, (28)
and the correlation matrix
AM = ⊕Mm=1
[
~/2ωjm 0
0 ~ωjm/2
]
=
1
4
Ω2M . (29)
3.2 Symplectic Transformation
The transformation L : R2M → R2M is called symplectic, when the correspond-
ing Weyl operators V˜ (z) = V (LT z) satisfies the Weyl-Segal CCR (25). We
denote the totality of symplectic transformation by Sp(M,R). It follows from
Stone-von Neumann theorem that there exists the unitary operator U satisfying
V (LT z) = U †V (z)U (30)
for any L ∈ Sp(M,R). We call such derived operator U the unitary operator
associated with symplectic transformation L. The characteristic function of ρ˜ℓ =
UρℓU † is given by
Trρ˜ℓV (z) =TrρℓU †V (z)U
=TrρℓV (LT z) = exp
[
i(Lv)T z − 1
2
zTLAML
T z
]
(31)
In the following we confine ourselves to the Gaussian state ρℓ given by Eq.
(18), and our interest is devoted to the case where the state ρ˜ℓ has the form of
⊗j∈J |α˜ℓj〉〈α˜ℓj |. Then the symplectic transformation should satisfy the condition
LAML
T = AM , which means
Ω−1M LΩM (Ω
−1
M LΩM )
T = I2M (32)
i.e.
Ω−1M LΩM ∈ O(2M) ∩ Sp(M,R) ∼= U(M) (33)
where U(M) denotes the totality of M ×M unitary matrices and O(2M) the
totality of 2M × 2M orthogonal matrices.
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3.3 Canonical Encryption
In the canonical encryption, we encrypt the message using unitary operator Uk
associated with Lk satisfying Eq. (33). In the isomorphism O(2M)∩Sp(M,R) ∼=
U(M), an element of O(2M) ∩ Sp(M,R),

r11R(θ11) · · · r1MR(θ1M )
...
. . .
...
rM1R(θM1) · · · rMMR(θMM )

 , (34)
corresponds to 

r11e
iθ11 · · · r1M eθ1M
...
. . .
...
rM1e
iθM1 · · · rMM eθMM

 ∈ U(M). (35)
with rij ∈ R and rotation matrices R(θij). We denote the unitary matrix
corresponding to Ω−1M LkΩM by ULk . Then we can find the Gaussian state
ρℓ = ⊗j∈Jρj(αℓj) is encrypted into
ρ˜ℓ = ⊗j∈Jρj(βℓj) (36)
with
(βℓj1 , ....., β
ℓ
jM )
T = ULk(α
ℓ
j1 , ....., α
ℓ
jM )
T . (37)
Note that the number M of encrypted modes can be taken larger than the
number N of pulse positions unlike the case of CPPM with the encryption (2).
3.4 Phase Mask Encryption
We consider an example of the canonical encryption. If rij = δij holds for
i, j = 1, ...,M in the matrix (35), the canonical encryption is called a phase
mask encryption and the matrix (35) is denoted by U(θ11, ..., θMM ). We assume
N is a prime number. Then in the right-hand side of Eq. (21), we have
{ei2πj(ℓ−1)/N ; ℓ = 1, ..., N} = {ei2πn/N ;n = 1, ..., N}, (38)
if the value of j is not divisible by N . So it is natural to consider the phase
mask encryption given by
ULk = U(2πk1/N
′, ...., 2πkM/N ′), (39)
where N ′ is a multiple of N and k = (k1, ..., kM ) with 0 ≤ km < N ′ is a key
generated from PRNG. Then each βℓjm in Eq. (37) takes values of the form
α1jme
i2πn′/N ′ , n′ = 1, ..., N ′. (40)
In particular, when N = 2,M = 1, this cryptosystem is equivalent to the αη
cryptosystem with PSK modulation. In Fig. 2, we show an example of signal
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configuration of αℓjm , β
ℓ
jm
in the case of N = 3, N ′ = 9,M = 2. The black points
in the figure represent the parameters αℓjm for the original set of signal states
{ρℓ, ℓ = 1, 2, 3}. By the phase mask encryption with N ′/N = 3 we can use 3
types of sets of signal states. In general, the condition p = N ′/N gives p types
of sets of signal states.
α j1
1
α j2
1
α j1
2
α j1
3
α j2
2
α j2
3
mode   j1 mode   j2
Figure 2: Signal configuration of a phase mask modulation (N = 3, N ′ = 9,M =
2)
Let us obtain Fourier series for the signal αℓ(t). For simplicity we use a
usual expression of Fourier series instead of Eq. (19):
αℓ(t) =
∞∑
j=−∞
cℓje
iωjt, (41)
where cℓj =
√
2π~ωj/Tα¯
ℓ
j and c
ℓ
−j =
√
2π~ωj/Tα
ℓ
j for j > 0. Then coefficients
cℓj are computed as
cℓj =
√
2π~ωc
T
√
NS(dℓj+jc + d
ℓ
j−jc ), (42)
where dℓj are Fourier coefficients of χIℓ(t):
dℓj =
1
N
e−iπj(2ℓ−1)/N sinc
j
N
π, (43)
with sincx = sinx/x. Fig. 3 shows how χIℓ(t) is transformed by the phase mask
encryption in a realistic setting, where the carrier frequency is fc = ωc/2π =
200[THz], the frequency resolution 1/T = 10[MHz], the bandwidth is limited to
9
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Figure 3: Example of a signal transformed by the phase mask encryption
1[GHz] (i.e. number of modes M is 100), N = 97 and N ′ = 9700. In this case
the transmission rate is R = lnN/T = 45.7 [M ebits/sec].
Since both of PPM signal and the one encrypted by a phase mask do have
most of their energy at frequencies included in the main lobe of sinc function,
effective modes for encryption are restricted to those frequencies. So in the case
of phase mask encryption we cannot set the value of M independently of N ;
when we use the modes j satisfying (j − jc)π/N < π, M = 2N − 1.
4 Evaluation of Eve’s symbol error probability
4.1 Heterodyne attack
Here we consider the phase mask encryption described in Sec. 3.4, avoiding
complicated notations. We can apply the same discussion to a general case. Eve
tries to estimate the classical message ℓ (or the secret key) from her observation
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of encrypted states
ρ(n′) = ⊗j∈Jρj(α1jei2πn
′
j/N
′
), (44)
where J = {j1, ..., jM} and n′ = (n′j1 , ..., n′jM ) with integers 1 ≤ n′jm ≤ N ′.
Then the error probability of her observation is given by
P = 1−
∑
n′
TrΠon′ρ(n
′), (45)
where {Πon′} is a positive operator valued measure (POVM) describing Eve’s
optimum measurement, and it goes to 1 as N ′ → ∞. This shows that Eve
cannot estimate the message ℓ correctly for enough large N ′. However it cannot
ensure that our proposed system exceeds the Shannon limit. In order to show it,
we have to evaluate Eve’s symbol error probability PE under assumption that
she can get the secret key K after obtaining cipher text by the measurement
{Πon′}.
In the following we evaluate Eve’s symbol error probability PE under the
above assumption. In addition we may assume that she uses the following
measurement on the modes J = {j1, ..., jM} of the states ρ(n′):
X(~β′) = ⊗j∈J
|β′j〉〈β′j |
π
, (46)
with ~β′ = (β′j1 , ..., β
′
jM
). Note that a measurement described by Eq. (46) is
realized by the heterodyne detection when the bandwidth 2B is enough small
[8]. Then Eve guesses a value of n′ from the result ~β′of the measurement by
using a function decided beforehand g : ~β′ → n′. This gives a POVM {Πn′}
describing a suboptimal measurement, where
Πn′ =
∫
g−1(n′)
X(~β′)d~β′. (47)
Here Eve’s symbol error probability PE is very little worse than that obtained
by the optimum measurement{Πon′}, because Eve does not know the secret key
K and there are phase (and amplitude) uncertainties for each βℓj , j ∈ J in Eq.
(36). Moreover we introduce a lower bound P¯E of PE by assuming Eve can
know the secret key after her obtaining an electrical signal by the measurement
(46). In this case Eve can discriminate plaintext directly as explained below.
Such a condition is too advantageous to Eve and hence P¯E only gives a very
loose lower bound of PE . However we have to confine ourselves to evaluating
the lower bound P¯E because of a difficulty in computing PE .
When a message ℓ is transmitted, Eve obtains the signal described as a
stochastic process
βℓE(t) =
∑
j∈J
√
2π~ωj
T
(
β′j
ℓ
e−iωjt + β¯′j
ℓ
eiωjt
)
(48)
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as a result of her measurement (46). Here ~β′ℓ = (β′ℓj1 , ...., β
′ℓ
jM
)T is a random
vector subject to the probability density function
Pρ˜ℓ(~β
′ℓ) = Trρ˜ℓX(~β′ℓ). (49)
In our setting, Eve knows the secret key K after her measurement. So using the
adjoint operator U∗Lk of ULk she can compute ~α
′ℓ = U∗Lk
~β′ℓ = (α′ℓj1 , ..., α
′ℓ
jM )
T ,
which is a random vector whose probability density is given by Pρ˜ℓ(ULk~α
′ℓ) =
Pρ˜ℓ(~β
′ℓ). From Eq. (49), we have
Pρ˜ℓ(~β
′ℓ) =TrUkρℓU
†
kX(
~β′ℓ)
=TrρℓU †kX(~β
′ℓ)Uk
=TrρℓX(~α′ℓ)
(50)
This shows that the random vector ~α′ℓ obeys to the probability density function
TrρℓX(~α′ℓ), i.e. α′ℓjm is a complex random variable with the mean α
ℓ
jm
and the
variance 1/2. As a result we can find that Eve obtains the signal
αℓE(t) =
∑
j∈J
√
2π~ωj
T
(
α′ℓj e
−iωjt + α¯′ℓj e
iωjt
)
, (51)
where random variables α′ℓj have the mean α
ℓ
j and the variance 1/2.
4.2 Eve’s symbol error probability
We evaluate Eve’s symbol error probability, when she tries to estimate the value
of ℓ from the signal αℓE(t). For the sake of brevity, we rewrite α
ℓ(t) and αℓE(t)
as
αℓ(t) = 2Re
∞∑
j=1
√
~ωjα
ℓ
jξj(t),
αℓE(t) = 2Re
∑
j∈J
√
~ωjα
′ℓ
j ξj(t),
ξj(t) =
√
2π
T
e−iωjt,
(52)
where we denote real part of complex number by Rez. Let us introduce an inner
product as
〈ψ, ϕ〉 = 1
4π
∫ T
0
ψ(t)ϕ(t)dt. (53)
We also use this notation for a complex function and have 〈ξj , ξk〉 = 〈ξ¯j , ξ¯k〉 = 0
and 〈ξ¯j , ξk〉 = 〈ξj , ξ¯k〉 = δj,k. By definition the signals αℓ(t) are orthogonal to
each other and hence we can constitute the orthonormal basis
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ψℓ(t) ≡ αℓ(t)/ ‖ αℓ ‖, ℓ = 1, ..., N, (54)
where the norm is given by
‖ αℓ ‖=
√
〈αℓ, αℓ〉 =
√√√√ ∞∑
j=1
~ωj |αℓj |2. (55)
From Eq. (17) we have another expression for the norm of αℓ as
‖ αℓ ‖2= ~ωcS, (56)
which shows that ‖ αℓ ‖ has a fixed value for any ℓ. With the basis {ψℓ}, we
represent the signal αℓ(t) as the vector (0, ..., 0,
√
~ωcS, 0, ..., 0), whose elements
take the value 0 except the ℓth element.
Let us obtain the vector representation of αℓE(t). Its kth element is computed
as
〈ψk, αℓE〉 = 〈ψk, 2Re
∑
j∈J
√
~ωjα
ℓ
jξj〉+ 〈ψk, 2Re
∑
j∈J
√
~ωjzjξj〉, (57)
where zj is a complex random variable with the mean 0 and the variance 1/2.
Here the second term is computed as
Re
∑
j∈J ~ωjα¯
ℓ
jzj
‖ αℓ ‖ , (58)
which has the variance
~ωc
D
2
(59)
with
D =
∑
j∈J |αℓj |2ω2j∑∞
j=1 |αℓj |2ωjωc
. (60)
Assuming that the signals αℓ have most of their energy at frequencies ωj (j ∈ J)
and ωc >> 1/(T/N), we have the approximations
αℓ(t) ≈ 2Re
∑
j∈J
√
~ωjα
ℓ
jξj(t) (61)
and dℓj+jc ≈ 0 in Eq. (42). Then it holds
〈ψk, 2Re
∑
j∈J
√
~ωjα
ℓ
jξj〉 ≈ 〈ψk, αℓ〉 = δkℓ
√
~ωcS, (62)
and
D ≈
∑
j∈J |αℓj |2ω2j∑
j∈J |αℓj |2ωjωc
≈
∑
j∈J (ωcNS/ωj)|dℓj−jc |2ω2j∑
j∈J (ωcNS/ωj)|dℓj−jc |2ωjωc
=
∑
j∈J′ |dℓj |2ωj+jc∑
j∈J′ |dℓj |2ωc
=
∑
j∈J′ |dℓj |2(j + jc)∑
j∈J′ |dℓj |2jc
≥ 1,
(63)
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with J ′ = {j; |ωj+jc − ωc| < B, j + jc > 0}, ωj = 2πj/T and ωc = ωjc =
2πjc/T . The last inequality in Eq. (63) is shown by using |dℓj | = |dℓ−j | and
it becomes the equality in the usual case, where ±j + jc has a positive value
for any j ∈ J ′. Thus we find the vector representation of αℓE is given by
(w1, w2, .., wℓ−1,
√
~ωcS+wℓ, wℓ+1, ..., wN ), where wk is a complex random vari-
able with the mean 0 and the variance ~ωcD/2. In the following for simplicity
we consider the equivalent situation where the vector representation is given by
(y1, ..., yℓ, ..., yN) = (w1, w2, .., wℓ−1, A+wℓ, wℓ+1, ..., wN ) with A2 = 2S/D and
wk has the mean 0 and the variance 1.
In our setting Eve uses maximum-likelihood decoding, where Eve picks the
element m for which ym is largest. According to [15], when message ℓ is sent
Eve’s symbol error probability is given by
P¯E =
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2π
exp
[
− (yℓ −A)
2
2
]
QN (yℓ)dyℓ, (64)
where QN(yℓ) is the probability that yℓ′ ≥ yℓ for some ℓ′ 6= ℓ:
QN (y) = 1− [Φ(y)]N−1,
Φ(y) =
1√
2π
∫ y
−∞
exp(−v2/2)dv. (65)
We remark that P¯E does not depend on ℓ. Recall the signals have duration T
and power ~ωcP = ~ωcS/T . Then
A =
√
2S/D =
√
2TP/D =
√
2TCE, (66)
with CE = P/D holds and the transmission rate is given by
R =
lnN
T
[ebits/sec]. (67)
Let us consider a Gaussian channel, where the input power is constrained to
~ωcP , the Gaussian noise has the variance ~ωcD/2 and the number of degrees
of freedom is unconstrained. Then its capacity per unit time is given by CE =
P/D[ebits/sec] (Corollary of Theorem 8.2.1 in [15]). In [15], it is shown that
P¯E → 0 as T → ∞ if R < CE by estimating lower and upper bounds of P¯E .
We show P¯E → 1 as T →∞ if R > CE by obtaining a lower bound of P¯E . We
start with the inequalities used in [15]:
P¯E ≥
∫ y
−∞
1√
2π
exp
[
− (yℓ −A)
2
2
]
QN (yℓ)dyℓ
≥ QN (y)Φ(y −A),
(68)
where y is an arbitrary number and QN(y)Φ(y−A) is the probability that yℓ < y
and yℓ′ ≥ y for some ℓ′. We can find lower bounds of Q(y) and Φ(y − A) by
using the standard inequalities on the Gaussian distribution for y > 0 [14]:(
1
y
− 1
y3
)
exp(−y2/2)√
2π
< Φ(−y) < 1
y
√
2π
exp(−y2/2). (69)
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That is, we have
QN (y) = 1− [1− Φ(−y)]N−1 = 1− exp[(N − 1) ln(1− Φ(−y))]
≥ 1− exp[−(N − 1)Φ(−y)]
≥ 1− exp
[
−(N − 1)
(
1
y
− 1
y3
)
exp(−y2/2)√
2π
]
,
(70)
and for y > A
Φ(y −A) = 1− Φ(−(y −A)) ≥ 1− 1√
2π(y −A) exp(−(y −A)
2/2). (71)
Putting
y =
√
f lnN > A, (72)
we obtain the lower bound of P¯E as
P¯E ≥

1− exp

−(1− 1
N
)(
1− 1
f lnN
)√
N2−f
2πf lnN




×
(
1− 1√
2π(
√
f lnN −A) exp
[
− (
√
f lnN −A)2
2
])
=
(
1− exp
[
− (1− e−RT )(1− 1
fRT
)√
exp((2 − f)RT )
2πfRT
])
×
(
1− 1√
2πT (
√
fR−√2CE)
exp
[
− (
√
fR−√2CE)2T
2
])
.
(73)
Here f is an arbitrary positive number satisfying the inequality
√
f lnN > A,
which is rewritten by using A =
√
2TCE and N = e
RT as
f >
2CE
R
. (74)
When it holds
CE < R, (75)
we can find a value of f satisfying f < 2 and the inequality (74). This shows
P¯E → 1 as T → ∞. Putting p¯1 = 1 − P¯E , from Eq. (73) we obtain a lower
bound for an exponent of p¯1 as
Es(R) = lim
T→∞
(
− ln p¯1
T
)
≥ (
√
fR−√2CE)2
2
. (76)
Considering f can take any value of 2CE/R < f < 2, we have
Es(R) ≥ (
√
R−
√
CE)
2. (77)
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Figure 4: Error probabilities of Bob and Eve with respect to signal duration T .
Eve’s symbol error probability P¯E under the assumption that she can know
the secret key after her measurement is plotted by the real line and Bob’s
symbol error probability P cB the broken line. The dot line represents the error
probability 1 − 1/N in the case where a message ℓ is randomly chosen from
N = eRT messages.
When T is large enough, P¯E is approximated and lower bounded as
P¯E ≈ 1− e−Es(R)T ≥ 1− e−(
√
R−√CE)2T . (78)
Fig. 4 gives graphs of error probabilities of Bob and Eve for the transmission
rate R = 45 [M ebits/sec], CE = 15 [M ebits/sec] and D = 1. In the graph
the broken line represents the symbol error probability P cB of Bob achieved by
the photon counting receiver, the solid line the lower bound P¯E of Eve’s symbol
error probability PE , the dot line its upper bound 1−1/N , which gives the error
probability when a message ℓ is randomly chosen from N messages. The symbol
N 2 22 24 26 28 210 212 214 218 222
T[µsec] 0.015 0.031 0.062 0.092 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.28 0.34
Table 1: Relation between number of pulse positions and signal duration T for
the transmission rate R = 45 [M ebits/sec].
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error probability P¯E is computed numerically from Eq. (64) without using the
lower bound. Note that P cB has a peak at T = (ln(1 + R/CE))/R = 0.031 [µ
sec] and takes a value of 4.52 × 10−3 at T = 0.36 [µ sec]. Here the value of
CE = P is fixed and hence the pulse energy S = CET increases as T does. So
e−S, which represents the probability that no photons are found in any of the
modes, decreases as T increases. On the other hand, when any photon is not
found, we have to guess a pulse position randomly. The error probability for
such a random decision, which is given by 1 − 1/N = 1 − e−RT in Eq. (6),
increases as T does. This is why the graph of P cB = (1 − 1/N)e−S has a peak
The number N of pulse positions is an important parameter to check feasi-
bility of the system. Table 1 shows a relation between N and duration time T
for the transmission rate R = 45 [M ebits/sec]. By using the relations S = TCE
and lnN = TR, Eq. (78) and the condition (75) for it can be respectively
rewritten as
P¯E ≥ 1− e−(
√
lnN−
√
S)2 (79)
and
eS < N. (80)
Fixing the value of E, we find that the error probabilities P¯E , P
o
B and P
c
B are
determined by the values of TCE , TR. This means that for an arbitrary number
g > 0, T = (1/g)T0, CE = gCE,0 and R = gR0 give the same value of the error
probabilities. On the other hand, the pulse duration
∆T =
T
eRT
=
1
g
T0
eR0T0
(81)
takes a smaller value as g (or R) takes a larger value.
We remark on the relation between the present system and the CPPM system
with the encryption (2). For the latter system we can obtain a lower bound P¯ ′E
of symbol error probability, assuming that Eve employs a heterodyne detection
on αkℓ,n in Eq. (2) and after her measurement she can get the secret key K [3].
Then it is found that the following equation holds approximately
P¯ ′E = P¯E . (82)
Here rigorously speaking it holds that P¯E > P¯
′
E when D > 1 in Eq. (63), but
in a natural setting we have D ≈ 1 and we may say Eq.(82) holds.
5 Conclusions
We have formulated a security evaluation of CPPM type of quantum random ci-
pher in terms of quantum Gaussian waveform, and have given the mathematical
derivation process of the lower bound of Eve’s symbol error probability under
the assumption that the secret key is given to Eve after her heterodyne mea-
surement. This model means that Eve can try to discriminate directly plaintext
instead of ciphertext after heterodyne measurement. Thus, this ensures a secu-
rity level being beyond the Shannon limit under stronger condition than in the
17
case that Eve uses the secret key after discrimination of ciphertext based on her
heterodyne measurement. We will report a basic experiment for the latter case
in the subsequent papers.
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